Back-door shenanigans
So picture this.
In the early 80's, a software developer creates an information management system to make it easier for government prosecutors to track witnesses and other information. The software is powerful -- whatever it is about it, it works and it works well. It's so good, the US DOJ wants to distribute it to all the major cities, and implement a national version of it. It gets distributed all up and down the line, in all our major systems.
But the DOJ has its share of corruption, and they end up stealing the software and bankrupting the company that created it. Meanwhile, they implement back-door functionality to allow anyone who knows the right password to snoop on any other system using the software. Know the password, and you have access to all the information.
So then the US sells the software to other countries, like Israel. And Robert Hanssen sells it to the Russians. And it somehow falls into the hands of Saddam Hussein under Bush 41. Even organized crime operations get it and use it. Not a bad idea; distribute the software to as many friendlies as possible, and allow spies to sell it to non-friendlies, knowing that you have the back-door password; you have access to all their systems, all their intelligence.
Now, with that setup in mind, picture this. Al Qaeda gets a copy of the software, through black-market channels in Russia. And somehow, they get access to the back-door. They would then have access to all our systems using the software; they would know what we know -- specifically, what we know about them. It's counter-intelligence, custom-built by our own boys and turned against us.
I'm thinking: Terminator 3. But it might have actually happened. And it would explain why the government, shortly after 9/11, put out a request for bids to software companies -- to build a new database information management system, with the major requirement being that it absolutely must not be built on any existing technology.
Food for thought.
Posted by Matt at July 9, 2003 11:30 AM
